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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did Defendant f a i l to properly ra ise h is challenge 
to the jury ins t ruc t ion concerning possession of recent ly s tolen 
property on d i rec t appeal? 
2 . If defendant 's challenge of the jury ins t ruc t ion 
was properly before t h i s Court on d i r ec t appeal, then was the 
issue disposed of by t h i s Cour t ' s per curiam opinion. State v. 
P i t t s , Utah, P.2d , No. 20290 ( f i led Janaury 28, 1986)? 
3 . Assuming arguendo t h a t rehearing i s warranted, did 
the jury in s t ruc t ion regarding possession of recent ly stolen 
property given in the ins tan t case so prejudice the defendant as 
to require reversal of the j u r y ' s ve rd ic t and the necessi ty of a 
new t r i a l ? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f -Respondent , 
- v -
LAWRENCE PITTS, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
: Case No. 20290 
P r i o r i t y No. 2 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lawrence P i t t s , was charged with Burg la ry , a 
t h i r d degree f e lony , i n v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(Supp. 1983) . 
Defendant was convic ted of b u r g l a r y , in a j u r y t r i a l 
he ld September 25-26 , 1984, i n t he Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court , 
i n and for S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, t he Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge , p r e s i d i n g . Defendant was sentenced by Judge Banks 
on September 28 , 1984, to a term of zero t o f i v e yea r s in t h e 
Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
This i s a response t o a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for 
r e h e a r i n g of a jj£X curiam opin ion f i l e d January 2 8 , 1986. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The S t a t e agrees wi th t he fac t s ta tement s e t f o r th in 
the C o u r t ' s op in ion i n S t a t e v. P i t t s , Utah, P.2d , No. 
20290, s l i p op. a t 1-2 ( f i l e d January 28 , 1986) (a copy of the 
complete opin ion i s conta ined i s conta ined in Appendix A.) 
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In addi t ion , the fo l lowing f a c t s are pert inent to t h i s 
p e t i t i o n for rehearing. Both the a p p e l l a n t s and r e s p o n d e n t s 
brief on d irec t appeal were f i l e d with t h i s Court by June 10 , 
1985. On October 2 1 , 1985, t h i s Court f i l e d s t a t e v . Chambers. 
709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and Sta te v . Pacheco, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18 (Utah 1985) . On November 5 , 1985, d e f e n d a n t s attorney f i l e d 
a l e t t e r with the Court Clerk request ing permission t o 
incorporate Chambers and Pacheco pursuant to Rule 24 ( j ) , Utah 
Rules of Appel late Procedure. This Court i ssued a pex curiam 
opinion in the ins tant case on January 28 , 1986. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant f a i l e d to properly ra ise h i s chal lenge to the 
jury i n s t r u c t i o n regarding possess ion of recent ly s t o l e n property 
on d irec t appeal and i s thereby precluded from ra i s ing the i s sue 
through a p e t i t i o n for rehearing. If the i s s u e was properly 
before t h i s Court, i t was disposed of in State v . P i t t s , Utah, 
No. 20290 ( f i l e d January 28 , 1986) . Assuming arguendo that 
rehearing i s warranted, the jury in s t ruc t ion concerning 
possess ion of recent ly s t o l e n property given in the ins tant case 
did not s h i f t the burden of proof to defendant. Therefore, 
d e f e n d a n t s p e t i t i o n for rehearing should be denied and h i s 
convic t ion affirmed. 
- 2 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PROPERLY RAISE HIS 
CHALLENGE TO THE JURY INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING POSSESSION OF RECENTLY 
STOLEN PROPERTY ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
Defendant contends his letter to the Court Clerk 
requesting permission to argue the constitutionality of the jury 
instruction in a supplemental brief and to incorporate State v. 
Chambers, 709 p.2d 321 (1985) and State v, Pacheco, 20 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1985)f effectively raised the issue on direct appeal. 
Defendant cites Rule 24(j)f Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as 
authority and relies on the fact that the letter was filed on 
November 5, 1985 and the opinion in this case was not filed until 
January 28f 1986. 
Although defendant's intentions to incorporate his 
challenge to the jury instruction concerning possession of 
recently stolen property may have been presented to the Court in 
a timely manner, Rule 24 (j) is an improper procedural vehicle to 
effectuate his intentions. Rule 24(j) provides: 
When pertinent and significant authorities 
come to the attention of a party after his 
brief has been filed, or after oral argument 
but before decision, a party may promptly 
advise the Clerk of the Court, by letter, 
with a copy to all counsel, setting forth 
the citations. There shall be a reference 
either to the page of the brief or to a 
point argued orally to which the citations 
pertain, but the letter shall without argument 
state the reasons for the supplemental cita-
tions. Any response shall be made within 7 
days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
Therefore, defendant was limited to citing supplemental 
authorities with reference to a page of his brief or a point 
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argued o r a l l y and was precluded from arguing a new i s s u e . 
Furthermore, Rule 24( j ) does not provide authority for a request 
to submit a supplemental br i e f . 
The proper procedural method for defendant to ra i se an 
i s s u e not argued on d i r e c t appeal by e i ther appel lant or 
respondent would have been a Motion to Amend h i s br ie f . Such a 
motion would be governed by Rule 23 (a) f Utah Rules of Appel late 
Procedure. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Rule 23(a) provides that an 
app l i ca t ion for an order or other r e l i e f sha l l be made by f i l i n g 
a motion "unless another form i s elsewhere prescribed by these 
r u l e s . " The r e l i e f sought by defendant i s not prescribed in any 
other s ec t ion of the Rules of Appel late Procedure. Rule 23(a) 
o u t l i n e s s p e c i f i c requirements including a clear statement of the 
r e l i e f sought, a part i cu lar statement of the factual grounds, a 
memorandum of po ints and a u t h o r i t i e s in support of the motion, 
and a f f i d a v i t s and papers, where appropriate. Defendant f a i l e d 
to comply with the requirements contained in Rule 23(a) to 
properly ra ise the i s sue on d irec t appeal and therefore h i s 
p e t i t i o n for rehearing should be denied. 
Moreover, as defendant po ints out, he argued the 
prec i s e i s s u e at t r i a l which now c o n s t i t u t e s the so le bas i s for 
h i s p e t i t i o n for rehearing (j&afi. a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for 
rehearing brief at 4 and R. 233-34) . Therefore, defendant was 
admittedly aware of the argument on September 26, 1984, but 
f a i l e d to ra i se the i s s u e on d i r e c t appeal in h i s i n i t i a l brief 
on appeal . This f a i l u r e to address the i ssue in defendant's 
brief on d i r e c t appeal c o n s t i t u t e s a waiver, s t a t e v. McNair, 
- 4 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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178 P. 48, 53 Utah 99 (1918); &££ alSQ. State v. Gotarez, 686 P.2d 
1224 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Hoisington, 657 P.2d 17 (Idaho 1983). 
Thus, the appropriate forum in which defendant may present his 
challenge to the jury instruction is pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus, not on direct appeal via a petition for rehearing. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING POSSESSION OF 
RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY WAS DISPOSED 
OF BY THIS COURT IN ITS £E£ JCILRIAM 
DECISION ISSUED JANUARY 2 8 , 1986. 
Defendant c la ims t h a t because t h i s Court did no t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ana lyze h i s argument concerning the j u ry i n s t r u c t i o n 
which d e a l t with pos se s s ion of r e c e n t l y s t o l e n p r o p e r t y , t h i s 
Court f a i l e d to cons ider the i s s u e . However, i t does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y follow t h a t because t h e i s sue was not analyzed in 
t h i s C o u r t ' s w r i t t e n op in ion t h a t t he Court did not summarily 
cons ider and d ispose of t h e i s s u e . 
Defendant complains t h a t the Court f a i l e d t o answer h i s 
l e t t e r dated November 5 , 1985 (See a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for 
r ehea r ing b r i e f a t 3 ) . However, t h a t l e t t e r r e l i e d upon Rule 
24( j ) which only a u t h o r i z e s i n c o r p o r a t i o n of supplemental 
c i t a t i o n s . I t does not suppor t a r eques t t o f i l e a supplemental 
b r i e f , nor does i t r e q u i r e an answer from t h e Cour t . Therefore , 
the only e f f e c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s l e t t e r of November 5 , 1985 was to 
draw t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n t o two r e c e n t l y decided cases and 
s t a t e t he reasons for the supplemental c i t a t i o n s . 
Consequent ly , a l o g i c a l conc lus ion for t h e omission of 
any a n a l y s i s of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n i s s u e from the C o u r t ' s per 
- 5 -
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curiam opinion i s that the Court considered defendant's argument 
and consciously disposed of the i s s u e without comment. 
POINT I I I 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN IN THE 
INSTANT CASE REGARDING POSSESSION 
OF RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY DID NOT 
SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant asserts that the jury instruction concerning 
possession of recently stolen property, as given in the instant 
case, unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant. He relies on State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 
1985) and State v. Pacheco, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1985) to 
support this contention. 
However, Chambers is clearly distinguishable. The jury 
instruction in Chambers was nothing more than a verbatim 
recitation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) ,x which was 
found to be unconstitutional under Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 
1965 (1985). By comparisonf the jury instruction given in the 
instant case was significantly different. Instruction No. 18 
provided: 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen when 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession 
is madef shall be prima facie evidence that the 
person in possession stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in 
1
 Section 76-6-402(1) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is 
made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that 
the person in possession stole the property. 
-6-
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possession of stolen propertyf that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the theftf and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession 
then you may infer from those facts that the 
defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find it 
justified by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with 
the offense of burglary. 
(R. 36). 
The trial judge included an explanatory paragraph which clarified 
the responsibility of the jury with respect to § 76-6-402(1). 
When taken in total, the jury instruction did not shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant. 
The jury instruction given in the instant case is 
substantively identical to the one given in State v. Pacheco, 20 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1985). And the State contends that this Court 
misapplied the holding of Francis v. Franklin, as analyzed and 
applied in Chambers, in deciding that the jury instruction given 
in Pacheco was unconstitutional. In Pacheco this Court created 
the impression that the challenged jury instruction was identical 
to the instruction stricken in Chambers. However, the records in 
those two cases reflect that the instructions given were indeed 
substantially different. S>Q£ the State's brief in support of its 
petition for rehearing in Pacheco at 3-10. This Court in Pacheco 
unexplainedly cited only the first paragraph of the overall 
instruction given in Pacheco's case (which embodied the Chambers 
instruction). However, the Court failed to acknowledger 
reconcile or even analyze the impact of the additional clarifying 
and modifying language contained in the Pacheco instruction which 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i s c r i t i ca l to the question of whether the overall instruction 
constituted a permissive inference or a mandatory presumption. 
By not analyzing the additional language in the Pacheco 
instruction, the Court has created confusion in the law with 
respect to how prosecutors should properly instruct a jury 
concerning a permissive inference under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
402(1) (1953), as amended. Indeed, the concern is great given 
that the Pacheco/Pitts type instruction is a stock instruction 
used in the Third Judicial D i s tr i c t . 
The general question presented in the instant case is 
the same as that presented in Franklinr Chambers and Pacheco: 
Did the jury instruction "have the effect of relieving the State 
of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
essential element of a crime?" Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1970 
(citations omitted). In deciding whether the instruction is 
unconstitutional under Franklinf the Court must necessarily 
consider all three paragraphs of the instruction, as well as 
other instructions given to the jury. As stated in Franklin: 
The analysis is straightforward. "The 
threshold inquiry in ascertaining the 
constitutional analysis applicable to this 
kind of jury instruction is to determine the 
nature of the presumption it describes." 
id., at 514, 99 S.Ct., at 2454. The court 
must determine whether the challenged portion 
of the instruction creates a mandatory 
presumption, see id.f at 520-524, 99 S.Ct., 
at 2457-2459, or merely a permissive 
inference, see Ulster County Court v. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-
2227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). A mandatory 
presumption instructs the jury that it must 
infer the presumed facts if the State proves 
certain predicate facts. A permissive 
inference suggests to the jury a possible 
conclusion to be drawn if the State proves 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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predicate fac ts , but does not require the jury to draw the conclusion. 
A permissive inference does not rel ieve the 
State of i t s burden of persuasion because i t 
s t i l l requires the State to convince the jury 
that the suggested conclusion should be 
inferred based on the predicate facts proven. 
Such inferences do not necessarily implicate 
the concerns of Sandstrom. A permissive 
inference v io la tes the Due Process Clause 
only if the suggested conclusion i s not one 
that reason and common sense just i fy in l ight 
of the proven facts before the jury. Ul ster 
County Court, supra. 442 U.S., at 157-163, 99 
S.Ct., at 2224-2227. 
Analysis must focus i n i t i a l l y on the 
spec i f i c language challenged, but the inquiry 
does not end there. If a specific portion of 
the jury charge, considered in isolation, 
could reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
offending words must be considered in the 
context of the charge as a whole. Other 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a 
reasonable juror could not have considered 
the charge to have created an 
unconstitutional presumption. Cupp v. 
Naughton. 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 
400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). This analysis 
"requires careful attention to the words 
actually spoKen to the jury . . ., for 
whether a defendant has been accorded h i s 
cons t i tu t iona l r ights depends upon the way in 
which a reasonable juror could have 
in te rp re ted the i n s t ruc t i on . Sandstrom. 
sjipxa, 442 U.S. , a t 514, 99 S.Ct., a t 2545. 
105 S.Ct. at 1971-72 (emphasis added). 
When th i s analysis i s applied in assessing the val id i ty 
of Instruction No. 18, i t becomes clear that a reasonable juror 
could only have understood that instruction to contain a valid 
permissive inference. First , although the f i r s t paragraph of the 
instruction, if considered in i so la t ion , could reasonably have 
- 9 -
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been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State 
of its burden of persuasion on the elements of burglary, when 
considered in the context of the instruction as a wholef a 
reasonable juror could not have considered that paragraph to have 
created an unconstitutional presumption. The second paragraph/ 
which clearly is stated in the form of a permissive inference, 
serves to explain the statement of law in the first paragraph. 
The words "shall be deemed prima facie evidence" are not readily 
understandable to the average juror. Therefore, a reasonable 
juror surely would have read the second paragraph which, 
significantlyf begins with the word "thus," as explaining the 
statement of law in the first paragraph. No reasonable juror 
could have read Instruction No. 18 as requiring a finding that 
defendant was guilty of burglary once he found beyond a reasonable 
doubt the enumerated predicate facts. Given the wording of the 
instruction and viewing it as a whole, a reasonable juror would 
have understood that he ma^ i, not must, find defendant guilty of 
burglary once satisfied that the predicate facts had been proved 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.2 
This conclusion is further supported by examining other 
instructions that were given to the jury. Instruction No. 3 read: 
You are instructed that to the Information 
the defendant has entered a plea of not 
guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each and all of the essential allegations 
of the charge contained in the Information 
and casts upon the State the burden of 
proving each and all of the essential 
allegations thereof to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(R. 22). Instruction No. 9 read: 
You are instructed that the defendant is a 
competent witness in his own behalf and has 
the right to go upon the witness stand and 
testify if he chooses to do so. However, 
the law expressly provides that no presump-
tion adverse to him is to arise from the 
mere fact that he does not place himself 
upon the witness stand. If he is satis-
fied with the evidence which has been 
given, there is no occasion for him to 
add thereto. 
So, in this case the mere fact that this 
defendant has not availed himself of the 
privilege which the law gives him should 
not prejudice him in any way. It should 
not be considered as any indication 
either of his guilt or of his innocence. 
2
 That the instructions1 first paragraph is a verbatim recitation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) does not automatically 
render the instruction unconstitutional. And, the use of the 
term "prima facie" does not in itself require a finding that 
there is Franklin/Sandstrom error. .£££ Chambers. 709 P.2d at 325 
(noting cases where this Court held that although the use of the 
term prima facie in an instruction was improper, it was not 
prejudicial in light of other instructions given to the jury). 
Instruction No. 18 does nothing more than instruct the jury on a 
"traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law." 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). .£££ 3lSQ. 
State v. Sessions. 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State v. 
EixJiham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967) (cases implicitly 
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the 
context of approving its use in burglary cases). 
-11-
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The failure of the defendant to testify 
is not even a circumstance against him 
and no presumption of guilt can be 
indulged in the minds of the jury by 
reason of such failure on his part, 
(R. 27). Instruction No. 11 provided in pertinent part: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and 
a defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt 
as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
(R. 30). Instruction No. 19 read: 
Before you convict the defendant, LAWRENCE 
PITTS, of the crime of Burglary, a Third 
Degree Felony, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of August, 
1984, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
defendant, LAWRENCE PITTS, entered or 
remained in the building of Handy Pantry; 
2. That he did so unlawfully; 
3. That he did so intentionally or 
knowingly; 
4. That he did so with the intent to 
commit a theft. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the State has proved each and 
every one of the above-mentioned elements, 
it is your duty to convict the Defendant. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has 
failed to so establish one or more of 
said elements, then you should find the 
Defendant not guilty. 
(R. 37) . And perhaps of roost significance, Instruction No. 22 
provided: 
If in these instructions any rule, direction 
or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must 
be inferred by you. For that reason, ypu 
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are not to single out any certain sentence, 
or any individual point or instruction, and 
ignore the others, but you are to consider 
all the instructions as a whole, and to 
regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their relative 
importance-
(R. 40) (emphasis added)• 
Second, Ins t ruc t ion No. 18 contains an acceptable 
permissive inference given tha t "the suggested conclusion i s • . . 
one t h a t reason and common sense jus t i fy in l i g h t of the proven 
fac t s before the j u r y . " Frankl in , 105 S.Ct. a t 1971. The Supreme 
Court made t h i s c lear in Barnes v. United S t a t e s , 412 U.S. 837 
(1973), which held tha t an ins t ruc t ion on the common-law inference 
of gu i l ty knowledge from the unexplained possession of recently 
s tolen property s a t i s f i e d the requirements of due process. Xd. a t 
841-46. £££ aJL££ State V. Sessions; S ta te v. Kirkham, (fiuptar 432 
P.2d at n. 2) . 
S ign i f i can t ly , the P i t t s ins t ruc t ions do not have the 
problems iden t i f i ed by the Court in the in s t ruc t ions i t found to 
be unconst i tu t ional in Chambers. There, the verbatim rec i t a t ion 
of § 76-6-402(1) appeared alone f without the explanatory paragraph 
included in P i t t s Ins t ruc t ion No. 18. Chambers, 709 P.2d a t 324. 
Furthermore, in Chambers a separate ins t ruc t ion defined the term 
prima fac ie in such a way tha t i t "could well have indicated to a 
juror tha t the defendants were required to disprove gui l t"—a 
defect t h a t could not be cured by another ins t ruc t ion tha t 
r e s t a t ed the presumption in permissive form. i d . a t 326. 
In sum, Chambers i s c lear ly d is t inguishable from the 
ins tan t case. Furthermore, t h i s Court misapplied Franklin, as 
- 1 3 -
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analyzed and applied in Chambers, in holding that the jury 
instruction in Pacheco was unconstitutional. Thereforef the jury 
instruction given in the instant case did not unconstitutionally 
shift the burden to defendant to establish his innocence. 
CONCLUSION 
F i r s t , defendant f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y r a i s e h i s cha l l enge 
to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on d i r e c t a p p e a l . 
Secondly r t h i s Court d i sposed of t h e i s s u e wi thout comment in i t s 
JJM£T curiam op in ion i s s u e d January 28
 f 1986. F i n a l l y , assuming 
arguendo t h a t r e h e a r i n g i s war ran ted f t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n given 
i n t h e i n s t a n t case d id not u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t the burden of 
proof t o defendant t o prove h i s innocence . Consequent ly , 
d e f e n d a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for r e h e a r i n g should be denied and h i s 
c o n v i c t i o n a f f i rmed . , , 
DATED t h i s P - C day of February , 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
At to rney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- — o o O o o — ~ 
The State of Utah, No. 20290 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v. January 28, 1986 
Lawrence Pitts, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant contests his conviction of burglary under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-2 (as amended), claiming that he was 
entitled at trial to a jury instruction on the lesser offense 
of theft.1 He also appeals his conviction on the basis that 
the evidence fails to show an unlawful entry with the intent 
to commit theft. We affirm. 
The Handy Pantry is a convenience store located on 
Salt Lake City's west side. The front area of the building, 
where the retail goods are displayed and sold, is open to the 
public. At the rear of the retail area, a door opens into an 
office and other rooms behind. The door from the retail area 
into the office is generally left open unless the store's 
manager is working in the office. On both sides of the door, 
signs printed in red ink indicate to the public that the 
office area is for employees only and others will be 
prosecuted. Nonemployees are never permitted to enter into 
the office or the rooms behind except by specific invitation 
of the manager. The store's business records are kept in a 
small desk located in a far corner of the office away from the 
door. The store's blank checks are kept in the desk and a 
metal box underneath the desk. 
On Saturday morning, August 4, 1984, the store 
received in the mail a dark yellow bank envelope containing 
its bank statement and cancelled checks. The envelope was 
placed on the desk in the back corner of the office. 
1. A person is guilty of burglary "if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with the 
intent to commit a felony or theft . . . ." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-6-202 (1978 ed.). A person commits theft if "he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another 
with the purpose to deprive him thereof." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-6-404 (1978 ed.). 
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On Saturday evening, defendant drove to the Handy 
Pantry store with two women—Miss Longton, who testified, and 
an unidentified woman—ostensibly to buy baby formula for 
defendant's child. Longton was the owner of the car which 
defendant was driving that evening and the next day when 
arrested. Defendant entered the store with the unnamed woman, 
while Longton remained outside to make a telephone call. 
In the store, defendant made no purchase of his own, 
but was observed hanging around the cash registers, apparently 
waiting for the woman to make her purchase. No one saw 
defendant leave the store, but when he returned to the car he 
had a dark yellow envelope similar in appearance to the store's 
bank envelope delivered that morning. Longton inquired 
regarding the envelope, and defendant told her that the 
envelope contained checks, but "they weren't for him, somebody 
else could use them." 
Defendant drove to Miss Longton's home, where he 
dropped her off. Later that night, he drove her car to the 
home of another female friend, Sharon Spencer. She observed 
the bank envelope next to defendant in the car. He took the 
envelope with him into her house and kept it in front of him 
while watching television on the sofa. Early the next morning, 
defendant left the house, taking the bank envelope with him. 
On Sunday morning, August 5, Miss Longton reported to 
the police that defendant had not returned her car. A police 
investigation located defendant and Longton's car later that 
same morning. An officer found in the glove compartment of the 
car the Handy Pantry bank envelope delivered to the store on 
Saturday. In the envelope were the store's cancelled checks 
and five blank checks. Four additional blank checks were still 
missing and were later rejected by the bank when their forged 
negotiation was attempted. 
Defendant was charged with burglary of the checks and 
bank statements from the store. Defendant did not testify at 
trial. He offered no evidence to deny his entry into the 
store's office, explain his possession of the checks, or 
otherwise rebut the prosecution's evidence. He only attempted 
impeachment of Longton by reading a portion of her testimony at 
the preliminary hearing. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the prosecution 
failed to establish that when he entered into the back of the 
Handy Pantry, he did so unlawfully, with the intent to commit 
theft. Defendant argues that the evidence of theft was 
sufficient to require the giving of an instruction on theft as 
a lesser offense to burglary. Inconsistently, he also claims 
that the State failed in its burden to prove his intent to 
commit theft. 
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In State v. Baker, Utah, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), and 
subsequent cases,* we clearly delineated the necessary elements 
that require the giving of a jury instruction on a lesser 
included offense when requested by the defendant: (1) To 
constitute an "included offense," elements of both the greater 
and lesser offenses must be related and there must be some 
overlap of the evidence required to establish the commission of 
each offense* Id, at 158-59. (2) Before the trial court must 
instruct the jury on the included offense, there must be a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and 
convicting the defendant of the lesser offense. Id. ; see also 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(3) (a) & (4) (197.8 ed.). 
Defendant argues that theft is an offense included in 
burglary because there is an obvious relationship between the 
elements of each when an accused enters or remains unlawfully 
in a portion of a building "with the intent to commit a 
theft." The State replies that the societal interests 
protected by each offense are distinct and different. 
Therefore, under its proposed "inherent relationship" test, the 
State argues that there is no connection between burglary and 
theft. 
At common law, the societal interests protected from 
burglary were the sanctity and security of occupancy and the 
dwelling place. 3 Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 326, at 186 
(14th ed. 1980) . The interest violated by a theft was the 
right of ownership and possession of property. Id. § 354, at 
298. According to the State, because each crime was intended 
at common law to protect separate interests there was no 
"inherent relationship" between the offenses, and theft cannot 
be a lesser included offense of burglary. United States v. 
Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971). However, such an 
evaluation of offenses based solely upon common law 
expectations reflects the very same rigidity we rejected in 
Baker. Such a test is inconsistent with and defeats the 
purpose of section 76-1-402(3), which requires a factual 
analysis. Our statutory definitions of criminal conduct and 
culpability are significantly different from the old common 
law. The State's analysis ignores the plain language of 
section 76-6-202(1), which includes the intent to commit a 
theft in the definition of "burglary." 
2. State v. Smith, Utah, 700 P.2d 1106 (1985); State v. 
Brown, Utah, 694 P.2d 587 (1984); State v. Oldroyd, Utah, 685 
P.2d 551 (1984); State v. Shabata, Utah, 678 P.2d 785 (1984); 
State v. Bales, Utah, 675 P.2d 573 (1983); State v. Crick, 
Utah, 675 P.2d 527 (1983). We reject the suggestion by the 
State that State v. Brown, 694 P.2d at 590, is inconsistent 
with State v. Baker. 
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Under Bakerf an offense is included in a greater 
offense when there is "some relationship" between them and 
"some overlap" in the proof required to establish the elements 
of both offenses (e.g., the intent requisite to commit theft). 
See State v. Hill, Utah, 674 P.2d 96 (1983) (theft may be a 
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery). In this case, 
theft is a lesser included offense of burglary. A significant 
relationship exists between these two offenses because the same 
specific intent is required for each. The fact that the intent 
•to commit, theft is not a necessary element of all burglaries 
does not obviate the relationship between the two offenses in 
this case. 
However, the court did not improperly refuse the 
instruction because the requirement was not satisfied that 
there must be evidence to provide a rational basis for 
acquitting him of burglary and convicting him of theft, state 
v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; State v. Bales, 675 P.2d at 57?! 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d at 1110-11. There is no such evidence 
in this case. 
Specifically, there was no evidence presented to the 
jury that defendant lawfully entered or remained in the rear 
portion of the building where the store's checks were located. 
The evidence was undisputed that the office was not a retail 
sales area and not open to or used by the public. The area was 
off limits to customers and clearly so marked. Defendant 
offered no evidence that the back office was open to the public 
at any time, that he entered for any lawful purpose whatever, 
or that his purpose or intention in entering was benign. 
Defendant is entitled to an instruction on theft to 
advance his theory only if there is any evidence that, if 
believed by the jury, would acquit defendant of the charge of 
burglary. Defendant does not claim that he never entered the 
back room at all. He did not testify that he mistakenly picked 
up the store's blank checks and bank records. There was no 
evidence that would permit the jury to find that defendant 
entered or remained in the back room for any purpose other than 
with the intent to commit a theft or other felony. The theory 
that defendant may have just innocently wandered back to find a 
restroom or that the office was open to the public is 
unsupported by any evidence. A mere theory argued by counsel 
but unsupported by any evidence will not satisfy the Baker 
analysis. Without offering any evidence that his entry into 
the rear office was lawful, defendant was not entitled to an 
instruction on theft. Martinez v. State, Tex. App., 635 S.W.2d 
629 (1982). See also Leppek v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1117 
(1981); State v. Ocean, 24 Or. App. 289, 546 P.2d 150 (1976). 
Defendant also argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the requisite intent. Although the 
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evidence as to defendant's unlawful entry and intent was 
circumstantial, it was not so ambiguous as to be susceptible to 
the interpretation that defendant was not guilty of burglary 
but was guilty of theft. Even am innocent entry into the 
office would not acquit defendant if he remained therein with 
the unlawful purpose of stealing the checks. Section 
76-6-202(1); People v. Blair, 52 111. 2d 371, 288 N.E.2d 443 
(1972) (entrance into a public place is authorized only for the 
lawful purpose consistent with the reason the building is so 
opened). But defendant did not testify, and there was no 
evidence that his entry or presence was with any intent other 
than to commit theft. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d at 576. 
The mere unlawful entry into private premises may not 
alone support a finding of intent. But defendant's unexplained 
possession of another's property, his subsequent statements and 
conduct, and other unrebutted evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances also support the reasonable inference that 
defendant entered or remained in the office with the specific 
intent to commit theft. Sims v. State, 272 Ark. 308, 613 
S.W.2d 820 (1981); State v. Harper, 235 Kan. 825, 685 P.2d 850 
(1984); see State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856 (1981); State 
v. Brooks, Utah, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (1981); Wharton's Criminal 
Law, supra §§ 338-40, at 217-22. To prove intent, the State is 
not required to show circumstances that are identical to the 
circumstances in the cases cited above. The circumstances 
evidenced in this case are more than sufficient to justify a 
finding of intent to commit theft. That finding is supported 
by substantial evidence, 
We affirm the conviction. 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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